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RIGHTS AGAINST FOREIGN AIRLINES UNDER THE
DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT CLARIFIED
Bergeron v. K. L. M.
188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
An airplane operated by K. L. M., the Royal Dutch airline, crashed
into the Atlantic Ocean while enroute from Shannon, Ireland to New York.
The personal representative of one of the victims of the crash brought
actions under sections one and four of the Death on the High Seas Act,1
in addition to an action at law based upon a right of action granted by
Dutch law. The respondent moved to dismiss the action under section one
and the action at law. The court upheld the motion on both actions.
The major question involved in the case was the availability of the
cause of action created by section one of the act:
§ 1. Right of action; where and by whom brought
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia,
or the Territories or dependencies of the United States,2 the per-
sonal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty,
for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent,
child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corpo-
ration which would have been liable if death had not ensued.3
The respondent airline argued that the action provided by this section is
not available against foreign respondents, due to the presence of section
four of the act:
§ 4. Right of action given by laws of foreign countries
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any
foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained
in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United
States without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the
contrary notwithstanding.4
The availability of the action provided by section one has occasioned
considerable confusion. The question has achieved real importance where
1 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958).
2 It has been held that a maritime tort is deemed to occur, not where the wrongful
act or omission has its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission pro-
duces such injury as to give rise to a cause of action. Noel v. Airponents, Inc.,
169 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D.N.J. 1958); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp.
85, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
3 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
4 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1958).
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the foreign right has been barred by a short statute of limitations 5 or
has been otherwise unavailable. 6 Any approach to the problem requires
an assessment of congressional intent in order to answer two distinct ques-
tions: (1) is the section one action to be restricted to suits against domestic
respondents? and (2) does the existence of a foreign right of action pre-
clude the use of section one, even though the first question has been
answered in the negative?
The leading case concerned with interpretation of broad statutory
language in a maritime act is Lauritzen v. Larsen.7 That case deals with
the words "any seaman" in the Jones Act.8 The libellant was a Danish
citizen injured aboard a Danish vessel in Cuban waters. Finding no evidence
of the intended breadth of this language in legislative history, the Court
"borrowed" the tools of choice of law in order to supply that intent. The
Court found in the case before it seven factors important as "contacts"
providing bases for choice of law.9 A great deal of emphasis was placed
upon "the law of the carrier's flag."' 0 The reasons underlying this emphasis
are peculiarly applicable to questions of maritime law:
Each state under international law may determine for itself
the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant
ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring author-
ity over it. . . "And so by comity it came to be generally
understood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline
and all things done on board which affected only the vessel or
those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity of
the country, or the tranquility of the port, should be left by the
local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation
to which the vessel belonged as the laws of that nation or the
interests of its commerce should require . . .,,
It must be noted that the Court selected its contacts and assigned them
various weights in accordance with the situation before it. The Court
recognized that a degree of flexibility is necessary to this approach:
The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing
of the significance of one or more connecting factors between the
shipping transaction regulated and the national interest served by
the assertion of authority. . . . We therefore review the several
5 The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). See also The Vulcania, 32 F. Supp.
815, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
0 Noel v. Airponents, Inc., supra note 2; Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.DN.Y. 1957); Iafrate v. Compagnie G~nrale Trans-
atlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); The Vulcania, supra note 5.
7 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
8 Jones Act § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
9 These were: (1) place of the wrongful act, (2) law of the flag, (3) allegiance
or domicile of the injured party, (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner, (5) place
of contract, (6) inaccessability of the foreign forum, and (7) the law of the forum.
The Court placed very little weight upon the last three contacts. 345 U.S. at 583-92.
10 345 U.S. at 585-86.
11 Ibid.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
factors which, alone or in combination, are generally conceded to
influence choice of law to govern a tort claim, particulary a mari-
time tort claim, and the weight and significance accorded them.12
The approach outlined in Lauritzen, therefore, must be applied with a
view toward the specific context, rather than by mechanically applying
the factors and their relative weights set out there.
The principal case concerns a situation requiring the application of
the Lauritzen approach. The terms of the statute's coverage are extremely
broad and legislative Iiistory is of no aid in assertaining the limits of its
coverage. The context of the principal case concerns all the same contacts
outlined in Lauritzen; however, the relative importance of those contacts
must shift radically. Unlike Lauritzen, this case concerns an aircraft rather
than a seagoing vessel. For this reason great emphasis cannot properly be
placed upon "law of the flag," as reasons for the peculiar applicability
of that contact disappear when ships are not involved. The "law of the
flag" doctrine arose in an age when ships were out of port for months and
away from home for years.13  It loses much of its relevance under con-
ditions of modern air travel involving only brief contact between carrier
and passenger.14 Indeed, courts have not consistently applied the doctrine
in aircraft cases. One of the doctrine's purposes was to establish liability for
shipboard injury in foreign waters; 15 yet it has been widely held that the
"law of the place" governs torts occurring on aircraft over land or terri-
torial seas.1 6 Furthermore, courts have differentiated between ships and
aircraft when applying other admiralty doctrines. 17 Additionally, the
federal statute sanctioning limitation of shipowners' liability does not cover
airlines;' 8 thus any congressional policy of discrimination against owners
12 Id. at 582 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court, in discussing the weight
of each factor individually, does consider elements of the situation before the Court.
Id. at 583-92.
13 Higgins & Colombos, International Law of the Sea 212-13 (3d ed. 1954)
(floating-territory doctrine traced to 1752); I Moore, Digest of International Law
933 (1906). See Note, 67 Yale LJ. 1445, 1454 (1958).
14 McNair, Law of the Air 110 (2d. ed. 1953); Honig, Legal Status of Aircraft
98-99 (1956).
15 See, e.g., Markakis v. Liberian S/S The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp.
487, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931);
Shorter v. Bermuda and West Indies S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
11G See, e.g., Komlos v. Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 820 (1954); Werkley v. K.L.M., 111 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
17 E.g., Foss v. The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914)
(maritime salvage and repair lien not applicable to aircraft). See also Air Commerce
Act § 7(a), 44 Stat. 572 (1926), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 177(a) (1952) ("the navi-
gation and shipping laws of the United States . . . shall not be construed to apply
to seaplanes or other aircraft. . .. ."); Comment, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 907, 919 (1955);
Note, 67 Yale LJ. 1445, 1457 (1958). Under international law airplanes do not
have the right accorded ships to innocent passage over territorial waters. McDougal
& Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspective Versus National
Egoism," 67 Yale L.. 539, 579 (1958).
18 Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (act
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of alien vessels would not be frustrated by limiting the emphasis to be
placed upon "law of the flag."' 9
A recent decision adopted the Lauritzen analysis where the applica-
bility of section one of the Death on the High Seas Act was in question.2 0
That decision recognized the need for shifting emphasis in accordance with
the specific situation, and did not follow the primacy accorded "law of the
flag" by Lauritzen. The Bergeron court also adopts this approach. The
court notes approvingly the decisions allowing section one actions against
foreign respondents where the libellant has not successfully pleaded a
section four action.21 Thus, the court answers our first question in the
negative-section one is not to be restricted to suits against domestic re-
spondents, but shall be available upon a finding of a preponderance of
relevant contacts.
This court, however, takes the Lauritzen approach one step beyond
previous cases. The approach is used in solving the relationship between
sections one and four. This is accomplished by treating the existence of
a section four action as one of the factors to be considered in deciding the
applicability of section one. Section four is construed as embodying a
congressional policy favoring application of foreign law whenever that law
provides the libellant an action.22 An additional relevant contact thus has
been added to the weighing and balancing process.
The Bergeron court stated that this was the first case in which the
question of the relationship between sections one and four has been squarely
before the court.23 While several previous cases have discussed the question,
Bergeron classifies these discussions as dicta, on the ground that no foreign
right was available in those cases. 24 However, although there was some
evidence in those cases that no foreign right was available, no such finding
was made by any of those courts. Those courts have attempted to solve the
problem by interpreting the language of the two sections. Such attempts
limiting shipowners' liability not applicable to owner of aircraft). See also Note,
67 Yale LJ. 1445, 1457 (1958).
19 The Vestris, supra note 5. See also S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1919); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1152, 1154 (1958); Note, 67 Yale LJ. 1445, 1448-49
(1958).
20 Noel v. Airponents, Inc., supra note 2. But see Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, supra note 6 (where a "substantive-procedural" test is followed; section
one declared "procedural," and therefore available in all cases as the law of the forum).
See also lafrate v. Compagnie G6nrale Transatlantique, supra note 6 (assumed with-
out discussion that section one is available against foreign respondents; no conflicts
test applied). One very recent case has flatly rejected the Lauritzen approach. The
court narrowly construed § 1 to cover only actions against American flag carriers. The
court left open the question of a § 1 action where a foreign right of action is not
available. Bergeron and other recent cases were ignored. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.,
191 F. Supp. 557 (D. Del. 1961).
21 Bergeron v. K.LM., 188 F. Supp. 594, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
22 Id. at 597.
23 Id. at 596.
24 Ibid. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 20.
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have resulted in confusion and conflict: some courts have held the sections
to be mutually exclusive; others have held both sections to be available.P
It is submitted that Bergeron has taken the proper approach in apply-
ing the Lauritzen analysis to this problem. Nowhere in the language of
these sections can one find any clear evidence of Congress having expressed
any intent as to this relationship. Legislative history is of no assistance,
and use of this approach nicely "ties together" provisions concerning foreign
and domestic actions.
This decision provides a method of discerning the relationship between
sections one and four; it also helps resolve conflict over the interpretation
of section four itself. The interpretation placed upon this section is
obviously crucial to the outcome when the Lauritzen approach is applied to
section one. The permissive verb "may" opens to doubt any interpretation
finding a policy definitely favoring the application of available foreign law.
However, the Bergeron court advances convincing arguments for its inter-
pretation:
It is certainly anomalous for the representative of a decedent
who died on a foreign vessel to have two bases for recovery, while
the representative of a decedent dying on an American vessel is
limited to a single cause of action under section one. It is most
difficult to attribute such an intent to Congress. It seems clear
that the primary purpose for the enactment of the Death on the
High Seas Act was to assure that there would be some recovery for
the wrongful death of American citizens dying in disasters on the
high seas.26
While conflicting interpretations might be supportable to some degree,2 7
the Bergeron interpretation appears to follow the principal policy under-
lying the passage of the act. If future decisions will follow this interpre-
tation, much of the conflict in this area will be resolved.
There is little agreement upon the other question decided in Bergeron:
the maintenance of an action at law based upon the foreign right of action.
A series of decisions has held such an action to be available despite the
use of the words "in an appropriate action in admiralty" in section four.2 8
These cases hold that section four created an admiralty action in addition
25 Holding the sections to be mutually exclusive: The Vulcania, 32 F. Supp. 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1940), 41 F. Supp. 849 (1941); The Vestris, supra note S. Holding both
sections available: cases cited in supra note 20. Note that all these cases were before
the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
28 Bergeron v. K.L.M., supra note 21, at 596-97. See also The Vestris, supra
note 25; Robinson, "Wrongful Death in Admiralty and the Conflict of Laws," 36
Colum. L. Rev. 406 (1936); -Comment, 41 Cornell L.Q. 243 (1956).
27 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, supra note 6.
28 See, e.g., Sierra v. Pan-American World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519
(D.P.R. 1952); Powers v. Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd., 32 F.2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1925);
Bergden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946); Wyman v.
Pan-American Airways, Inc., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 262
App. Div. 995, 30 N.Y.S.2d. 816 (1941); Elliot v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4
N.Y.S.2d 9 (1938).
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to the action at law. Another line of cases has held that section four intends
the admiralty action to be the only action available 2 9 Writers on the
subject similarly disagree on this question, each stating flatly that one or
the other of these views is "the law."30 This is also a question of legislative
intent, but legislative history is ambiguous and has been construed to
support either view.31 Thus the courts are left to construe the ambiguous
terms of the statute. Bergeron follows the cases disallowing the action,
largely because allowing the action makes a jury trial available in the
action against the foreign respondent, while jury trial remains unavail-
able in admiralty actions against domestic respondents. 32 The court also
noted "the administrative difficulties in allowing claims based on identical
statutes to be brought in the same action both at law, with a jury, and in
admiralty, without a jury . ...
Confusion has been the keynote of suits brought under the Death on
the High Seas Act for the past two decades. Courts have reached a
measure of agreement only in the application of Lauritzen's "contacts" to
the action under section one to determine "which law" shall apply. The
Bergeron court appears to have settled much of the confusion on the re-
lationship between sections one and four. It has brought to the inquiry
a test flexible enough to meet all situations, and a test which explains much
of the conflict in previous decisions. The court has followed this with a
reasonable interpretation of section four: one which-if followed-can
eliminate much of the remaining confusion.
There has been a similar lack of agreement on availability of the
action at law. The reasoning of Bergeron is persuasive, but does little to
help ascertain congressional intent. So long as the provision of the act
is ambiguous on this point no agreement can be expected, since courts put
emphasis on different, equally persuasive, factors lying outside the statute.34
The questions involving the interpretation of section four could best
be resolved by legislative determination. The present terms are ambiguous,
and there is no certainty that courts will follow Bergeron's interpretation
of section four.
Congress can do a great service to transoceanic air passengers by
making separate provision for aviation deaths on the high seas. Tenuous
29 See, e.g., D'Aleman v. Pan-American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1958); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 2. See also Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (dictum in n. 25 and n. 28).
30 Supporting the restricted view: Edelman, Maritime Injury and Death 139
(1960); Comment, 41 Cornell L.Q. 243, 248-49 (1956). Supporting the other view:
Benedict, Admiralty 382 (6th ed. 1940); Robinson, Admiralty Law 141-43 (1939).
31 See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 2.
32 Bergeron v. K.L.M., supra note 21, at 598.
a3 Ibid.
-34 Compare Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 2, with Elliot v. Steinfeldt,
supra note 28.
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and unpopular35 analogies between transoceanic air and sea commerce,
supporting the application of admiralty doctrines to aviation cases, can
be avoided by provision of a true "air law" applicable to these cases.
This would afford Congress an opportunity clearly to state and implement
policies drafted with a consideration of the requirements and factual circum-
stances of modern aviation.
35 Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, supra note 6; Note, 67 Yale
L.J. 1445 (1958). See also McNair, Law of the Air 107-16 (2d ed. 1953).
